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SANCTIONABLE CONDUCT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
STEALTHILY OPENED THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE
by
Sonja R. West
The Supreme Court's decision in Morse v. Frederick signaled that public
school authority over student expression extends beyond the schoolhouse
gate. This authority may extend to any activity in which a student
participates that the school has officially sanctioned. The author argues that
this decision is unsupported by precedent, and could encourage schools to
sanction more events in the future. Because the Court failed to limit or define
the power of a school to sanction an activity, the decision could have a
chilling effect on even protected student expression. The author commends
the Court for taking up this issue after a long silence, but concludes that the
messy facts in the case chosen made the case a poor vehicle for the Court to
address the underlying school-speech issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One January day a young man chose to peacefully display a banner
with a message of his choice. He did so while standing on public property
and at a public event. A government official on the scene, however,
disapproved of the banner's message. So the official tore down the sign
and punished the young man for displaying it. If any other resident
standing on that crowded public sidewalk-the epitome of a
Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Georgia School of Law. I would like
to thank Dan Coenen, Anne Dupre and Mike Wells for their helpful comments.
While I was involved in the Morse v. Frederick case on behalf of amici curiae, the
thoughts expressed in this Article are solely my own and do not represent the views of
any other person or organization.
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quintessential public forum'-had engaged in this simple act of self-
expression, the First Amendment would have protected him from such
blatant viewpoint-based censorship.2
Yet the young man in this case was not so fortunate. The Supreme
Court concluded that the government's censorship of him was
constitutional for two primary reasons. First, he was at the time a public
high school student. And, second, he chose to express himself during a
public event that his school, he later learned, had decided to "sanction."
The ability of teachers and school administrators to punish students
for their speech while at school is an area laden with legal uncertainty.
The Supreme Court's few cases addressing student speech have answered
only a handful of questions regarding school officials' ability to censor
their students while in the classroom, during a school assembly or when
participating in a school sponsored, non-public forum. These cases,
however, have left open a number of scenarios where it remains unclear
how courts should balance students' free speech rights against school
officials' authority. Thus it was of heightened importance when the Court
broke its almost twenty-year silence on the topic of the free speech rights
of public school students in the case of Morse v. Frederick.!
In deciding the case of Joseph Frederick and his "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS" banner, a majority of the Court concluded that Frederick's
principal, Deborah Morse, could lawfully restrict his expression under
the Court's school speech precedents. In a concurring opinion, two key
Public sidewalks "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v.
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 460 (1980) (holding that access to sidewalks "for the purpose of exercising such
rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely" (quoting Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976)); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)
("This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise
of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion.. ").
2 Viewpoint-based discrimination by the government "is ordinarily subject to the
most exacting First Amendment scrutiny." Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d
200, 207 (3d Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he point of the
First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion
other than silencing speech on the basis of its content." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 392 (1992); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 828 (1995) ("Discrimination against speech because of its message is
presumed to be unconstitutional."). With content-based regulation of speech,
moreover, the Court has held that "time, place, or manner" analysis is inapposite.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) (holding that
"[f]or a time, place, or manner regulation to be valid, it must be neutral as to the
content of the speech"); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) (holding that "time,
place, and manner" analysis is not applicable when statute "regulates speech on the
basis of its content"); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
US. 530, 536 (1980) ("[A] constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner
restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.").
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
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justices attempted to clarify and narrow the Court's ruling regarding the
types of speech schools may restrict. And the dissenting justices disputed
the majority's interpretation of the student's message. None of the
justices, however, devoted much thought in their opinions to the most
perplexing part of this ruling-that perhaps Frederick wasn't at school at
all.
On the day of the incident, Frederick had not stepped foot on
school property; rather, he was standing among the public on a public
sidewalk. He was present at a commercially sponsored, non-school
event-the running of the Olympic Torch Relay through his town. The
planning, creation and display of Frederick's speech occurred completely
off school grounds and without school resources. Thus it was the school
principal, not Frederick, who may have crossed the line (both physically
and legally) between the school and non-school environment when she
left school property, marched across the street, and grabbed Frederick's
banner.
The justices were unfazed by this state of affairs. Instead, they
dismissed the argument that the principal lacked jurisdiction over
Frederick by declaring that he was participating in a school "sanctioned"
event. By making this move, the Court-for the first time and with
virtually no discussion of the topic-signaled that public school authority
over student expression extends beyond the schoolhouse gate. The reach
of school officials, it seems, may now extend off campus and beyond
traditional school-sponsored events to include any activity the school has
sanctioned. Yet what exactly this important new sanctioning power
requires or entails is left undefined.
The position that schools may sanction a public event held on public
property is unsupported by the Court's precedents. What is more
concerning, the Court's ruling could encourage school authorities in the
future to sanction all sorts of off-campus community events, thereby
aggrandizing government power at the expense of expressive liberty. The
failure of the Court to define or limit this sanctioning power raises
disturbing questions and potentially could chill a large amount of
protected student expression. This Article addresses these questions by
both 'examining the logic of the Court's opinion and by plumbing the
troubling possible implications of the Court's new and mysterious
sanctioned events rule.
II. "BUT NOT ON THESE FACTS"
Chief Justice Roberts began his majority opinion in Morse by stating
that "[a] t a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, a high school
principal saw some of her students unfurl a large banner conveying a
message she reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use. He
Id. at 2622.
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then went on to conclude that the principal did not violate Frederick's
free speech rights by confiscating the banner and punishing him for
displaying it. According to Chief Justice Roberts, school district authority
over student speech might engender "some uncertainty at the outer
boundaries.., but not on these facts."5
The parties did not dispute most of the key facts in the Morse case. It
was agreed, for example, that Frederick was an eighteen-year-old public
high school senior when the Olympic Torch Relay came through his
hometown of Juneau, Alaska in January, 2002. The relay was sponsored
by Coca-Cola and other private local businesses as lart of the build up to
the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City. In Juneau, the event
caused much excitement. Citizens lined the streets to watch, and national
television cameras were on hand to record the festivities." The route for
the relay passed along Glacier Avenue in front of Juneau-Douglas High
School. The school thus decided to release its students from class to
watch the torch pass by.
Frederick, however, did not attend his first-period class that
morning. Instead he drove himself to the event. He parked his car several
blocks from the school and walked to the public sidewalk on the side of
Glacier Avenue across from the school. Once there, Frederick joined
friends and other members of the public who had gathered to view the
event. He and his friends waited peacefully for the torch to arrive.9 As the
torch passed, they unfurled a banner that read "BONG HiTS 4JESUS."'
The display of the banner, according to Frederick, was an attempt to
assert his First Amendment rights and to get on television."
Upon spotting the banner, school principal Deborah Morse crossed
the street and demanded that Frederick put the banner down.1
Frederick asked Morse about his First Amendment rights, and she
replied that the banner was not appropriate for display.13 When Frederick
refused to take his banner down, Morse grabbed it and crumpled it up.14
Morse later suspended Frederick for ten days.
5
There is some factual dispute about the terms of the students'
release from class that day. According to Frederick, the students were
released from class but not required to attend the relay. Rather, they
Id. at 2624 (emphasis added).
6 Joint Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 9, 15, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), available at 2007 WL 119039.
Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1115-16.
'o Id. at 1115.
Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 28.
12 Id. at 24.
" Id. at 25.
14 Id. at 25, 30.
15 Id. at 26.
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were simpl6 dismissed from school and told to return in time for their
next class. He submitted evidence that students were largely, if not
completely, unsupervised and that many students left the event and
school administrators did not attempt to stop them. 7 Student affidavits
described a scene of "chaos" including fights and students throwing
snowballs and plastic Coke bottles.'8 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, finding that supervision of students by the school was "minimal
or nonexistent."'' 9 In contrast, school officials testified that students were
required to watch the relay and teachers and administrators were
interspersed among the students in order to supervise them.0
Following the censorship of Frederick, the principal stated that she
had sanctioned the relay "as an approved social event or class trip," thus
giving her the same control over Frederick that she possessed in the
classroom. During Frederick's appeal of his suspension, the
superintendent of schools agreed that the torch relay was a "school-
sanctioned activity."2 2 There was, however, no evidence that either
students or parents had been informed of the official sanctioning of the
event, and it is clear that attendance was not taken and that parental
permission was not sought.23
Faced with this record, the district court held that there was no
factual issue whether this was a "school-sponsored" event.2' The court
noted that cheerleaders and the band were on hand to support the
runner and that "common sense" supported viewing the torch relay as a
school event because it occurred during school hours.2 5 The Ninth
Circuit, while ruling in favor of Frederick, also agreed that the torch relay
was a school event because "Frederick was a student, and school was in
session."26 The Supreme Court followed suit by concluding that because
the expressive activity occurred during school hours and at a school-
sanctioned event Frederick "cannot... claim he [was] not at school."27
III. CLASS DISMISSED: THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION
By concluding that the school had somehow sanctioned the Olympic
Torch Relay, the Supreme Court recognized-for the first time in its
1 Id. at 36.
Id. at 32, 38.
Id. at 29, 32, 38.
'9 Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006).
20Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 56.
21 Id. at 22-23.
2 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2007).
Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1116.
24 Frederick v. Morse, No.J 02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *4 (D. Alaska
May 29, 2003).
25 Id.
216 Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1117.
217 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624 (quotation omitted).
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history-a new and expanded jurisdiction of school administrators to
control their students' speech. In earlier decisions, the Court had
addressed only the special ability of school officials to restrict student
speech that takes place in the classroom, during a school assembly, or as
part of a school sponsored, non-public forum.
The question of whether the student is truly "at school" is an
important one, because the Court has emphasized that the rights of
students at school are not "coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings. ", 8 In this case there was great debate about whether the
principal in Morse lawfully censored Frederick under the Court's school
speech precedents even if he were at school. There is no doubt, however,
that First Amendment protections reach further for students outside of
the school setting than for students within it.
Prior to Morse, the Court had decided three key cases regarding
student speech at public secondary schools: Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,2 9 (finding school censorship of non-
disruptive student expression while at school to be unconstitutional);
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser30 (upholding a school's punishment
of a student who used lewd and vulgar language during a school
assembly); and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 31 (holding that
schools may regulate "school-sponsored" speech in the non-public forum
embodied in a school newspaper).
In each of these cases, the jurisdictional issue was not in dispute-it
was clear that all of the student speakers were, indeed, "at school." In
Tinker, several students wore black armbands to class in protest of United
States involvement in Vietnam, and they were punished for their
expression. The Supreme Court came down on the side of the students
and famously declared that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights .. . at the schoolhouse gate. 3 2 The Court held in Tinker that
"[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our
Constitution.,,3' And this constitutional personhood entitles them to
"fundamental rights which the State must respect."3 4 Students, therefore,
"cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal views on the
school premises-whether 'in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on
the campus during the authorized hours. ' '3 5 In accommodating student
speech rights in the "special characteristics" of the learning environment,
the Court declared that public authorities may censor student speech
2' Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
" Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
3' Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
32 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
"3 Id. at 511.
34 Id.
35 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13).
[Vol. 12:1
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only if it "materially and substantially disrupt[s] the work and discipline
of the school. 36
Almost twenty years later, the Court again looked at the issue of
school speech in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.37 In Fraser, the
Court upheld the school's suppression of an "offensively lewd and
indecent" speech 38 that a high school student gave during a school
",39
assembly that "was part of a school-sponsored educational program.
Because the student in Fraser was plainly "at school" at the time of his
speech, the majority did not have to dwell on the rule's application to off-
premise student speakers. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice
Brennan noted that "[i] f respondent had given the same speech outside
of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply
because government officials considered his language to be
inappropriate; the Court's opinion does not suggest otherwise."
40
Two terms later, the Court again took up the topic of school speech
in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.41 In Hazelwood, the Court
addressed the ability of high school officials to remove articles from the
school sponsored student newspaper regarding teen pregnancy and
parental divorce. While reaffirming Tinker,42 the Court declared that "a
school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of
student expression" in a non-public forum.43 The Court emphasized that
the school newspaper was produced with school resources through a
journalism class taught as part of the regular curriculum during school
hours for which students received academic credit and a grade. Citing
these specialized facts, the Court found no First Amendment violation
while noting that "the government could not censor similar speech
outside the school.,
45
6 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
3' 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
8 Id. at 685.
s Id. at 677.
40 Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
4' 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
12 Id. at 266.
43 Id. at 272-73.
44 Id. at 268.
45 Id. at 266. See also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 & n.22
(5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a student drawing was not "student speech on the
school premises" because it "was composed off-campus and remained off-campus for
two years"); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050-
52 (2d Cir. 1979) (refusing to apply Tinker to student newspaper published and
distributed off-campus); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir.
1987) (stating that burden of high school officials to justify censorship or punitive
authority over off-campus student speech would be "much greater, perhaps even
insurmountable" than over on-campus speech); Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-
Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. ScI. &
TECH. L. 243, 269-71 (2001) (noting that Tinker is ill-suited to deal with off-campus
student expression).
HeinOnline  -- 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 33 2008
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
In short, prior to Morse, each of the Court's school speech cases
concerned only student expression that occurred on school grounds
during class or as part of a formal institutional program. Even more
important, the Court had taken care to reserve its most restrictive rules to
non-public forums found to be school sponsored. None of the Court's
prior cases involved off-campus speech by students at a large scale public
event not organized by the school, conducted in a traditional public
forum, and overseen (if at all) in such a way that students could move
about the vicinity freely intermingling with members of the general
public.
IV. YOU SAY "SPONSORED" AND I SAY "SANCTIONED." LET'S CALL
THE WHOLE THING OFF
It was clear from the beginning of the Morse case that a key question
concerned the applicability of the Court's trilogy of school speech
precedents. In ruling against the student speaker, District Court Judge
John Sedwick noted that "[b]oth parties agree that a central issue is
whether the parade-viewing constituted a school-sponsored activity. For if
it did, there is little doubt that the school has wider discretion to control
Frederick's actions. 46
It was also evident from the beginning that the appropriate
terminology for framing the jurisdictional question was subject to
dispute. Judge Sedwick repeatedly referred to the issue in terms of
whether student viewing of the torch relay was school "sponsored," and
ultimately concluded that there was "no issue of fact as to whether or not
this was a school-sponsored activity."47 He relied on the evidence
presented from the school that the students were released to view the
relay and that the band and cheerleaders were on hand, he further
pointed to "common sense" to support his conclusion. Judge Sedwick
eventually declared that Frederick was "participating in a school-
approved event."
48
Similar analytical confusion lurked in the opinion of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Writing for the three-judge panel, Judge
Kleinfeld never described the relevant activity as "school sponsored,"-
instead he seemed to deem it decisive that the school had "authorized"
the activity.49 In support of this characterization, Judge Kleinfeld relied
on the evidence that students had been released from class and "even
though supervision of most students was minimal or nonexistent, the
school could have supervised them more if it chose to.' 50 Ultimately,
46 Frederick v. Morse, No.J 02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *4 (D. Alaska
May 29, 2003).
47 Id.
41 Id. at *5.
4' Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006).
'0Id. at 1117.
[Vol. 12:1
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Judge Kleinfeld determined that Frederick was under the school's
control because "Frederick was a student, and school was in session."
51
As the case made its way to the United States Supreme Court, the
parties continued to float various terms to denote the relationship (if
any) between the Olympic Torch Relay andJuneau-Douglas High School.
In their brief to the Court, the principal and the school district referred
repeatedly to the torch relay as a school "sponsored" activity 2 or a school
"sanctioned" event53 Amici supporting the school in the case also
described the event as school "sponsored,'" 54 and school "authorized"55 as
well as adding school "supervised",56 to the growing list of terms.
The Supreme Court joined in this dialogue.57 Chief Justice Roberts
began his opinion by declaring that Frederick was at "a school-sanctioned
and school-supervised event." 8 He later noted that the principal had
"sanctioned" the event and referred to it as a school "authorized"
activity.5 9 In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito described Frederick's
expression as "in-school" speech• 0 And in his decision concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, Justice Breyer decided that the
61
relay was a school "related" event.
51 id.
52 See Brief for Petitioner at 33, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No.
06-278) (stating that "Frederick's banner was unfurled in the midst of a highly
important 'school-sponsored' activity").
51 See id. at 31 (contending that Frederick's banner interfered "with a school-
sanctioned activity").
54 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
22, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278); Brief for D.A.R.E.
America, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16, Morse v. Frederick,
127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278); Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards
Association and American Association of School Administrators in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-
278).
5 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association and
American Association of School Administrators in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 54, at 21.
56 See, e.g., Brief for D.A.R.E. America, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 54, at 16.
57 At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts referred to the relay as a "school
sponsored activity." Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (2007) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy argued that Frederick's banner was
"[c]ompletely disruptive of the school's image that they wanted to portray in
sponsoring the Olympics." Id. at 50 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia stated that it was
.a public event that was sponsored, not sponsored, but to which the school had
directed the students to go." Id. at 53-54.
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
5' Id. at 2623-24.
'o Id. at 2637 (Alito,J., concurring).
61 Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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OnlyJustice Stevens, speaking for three dissenting justices, suggested
that it might not be clear whether the relay was a school event of some
form. He devoted a short footnote to this subject and gave principal
attention to governing school rules. He observed that it is "relevant that
the display did not take place 'on school premises,"' as the school
62district's rule against advocating illegal drug use requires. He added
that a separate, district-wide rule extended the school's anti-drug policy
to "social events and class trips," but commented that "Frederick might
well have thought that the Olympic Torch Relay was neither a 'social
event' (for example, prom) nor a 'class trip"' for purposes of this
63prohibition.
V. THE COURT'S PRIOR RECOGNITION OF SCHOOL-SPONSORED
SPEECH
The varying use of labels in this case is important. The justices'
semantic moves-particularly in shifting attention from school-sponsored
to school-authorized and school-sanctioned activities-signals that the
Court is stepping outside of its prior decisions and adopting a new view
of school control over student speech. The Court fails to elaborate,
however, on what this new view entails. Prior to Morse, the only term the
Supreme Court had embraced regarding the schools' ability to restrict
student speech was that of school "sponsored" speech. This analysis
comes solely from the 1988 Hazelwood decision regarding the ability of
public high school officials to regulate the content of the student
newspaper,
In Hazelwood the Court began by reaffirming the important
constitutional protections of Tinker,6 but then went on to explain that
"the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may
punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining
when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the
dissemination of student expression.6 The Supreme Court in Hazelwood
thus created two distinct categories of student speech. The first includes
"a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises" while the second covered "school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school."6 6 This latter category, the Court
explained, included activities that "may fairly be characterized as part of
the school curriculum ... so long as they are supervised by faculty
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to
Id. at 2647 n.2 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Thomas in concurrence did not address the jurisdictional question.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
65 Id. at 272-73.
id. at 271.
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HeinOnline  -- 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 36 2008
2008] SUPREME COURT OPENS THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 37
student participants and audiences. 67 The Court in Hazelwood held that
speech in the first category-speech that was not part of a school-
sponsored activity and not "disseminated under [the] auspices" of the
school-was entitled to a high level of First Amendment protection.68
The use of the term school "sponsored" to describe the Olympic
Torch Relay itself is clearly inaccurate.69 The facts are undisputed that the
relay was commercially and privately sponsored and received no financial
support or other resources from the school. It was not organized,
planned, or otherwise backed by the school in any way, and it did not
carry the school's name or insignia." The relay took place on public, not
school, property.71 And plainly it did not fall in the category of "school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.
7
1
There is a deeper problem with describing the relevant activity as
school sponsored" as used in the Court's prior student speech cases.
After all, the Court in Hazelwood did not consider whether any
generalized event or activity was school-sponsored, but whether the speech
at issue was school-sponsored. Students, for example, "cannot be
punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school
premises-whether 'in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours' , 73 even though those arenas are
clearly financed and supported by the school. It follows that even if
Frederick had displayed his banner at a school football game or other
event that was unquestionably "sponsored" by the school, the question
under Hazelwood would be whether the school was lending its name and
resources to Frederick's message in particular.
DidJuneau-Douglas High School sponsor Frederick's speech? Plainly
it did not. The school did not supply any of the resources involved in the
making or display of his banner. Frederick's speech was not reviewed by a
faculty member who exercised "a great deal of control" and was the "final
67 Id.
' Id. at 271-72; see also id. at 271 n.3 (explaining that "an off-campus
,underground' newspaper that school officials merely had allowed to be sold on a
state university campus" could not be suppressed (citing Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Bd. of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667)).
It is not entirely clear whether the "event" being discussed is the Olympic
Torch Relay itself or the students' viewing of the relay. At various points in the
litigation, some parties distinguished the two. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 54, at 22. Yet more often, the relay
itself was simply referred to as a school-sanctioned "event." See, e.g., Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
70 Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 9, 22-23.
71 Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 9, 15.
7' Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
71 Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
512-13 (1969) (citations omitted)).
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authority" over the speech.74 The banner was not produced in connection
with a class or school project, and Frederick did not receive a grade or
credit for the speech. And particularly because the message was conveyed
during an off-campus, public event, the school did not "lend its name
and resources to the dissemination of [the] student expression,"7 5 and
the speech was not "disseminated under [the] auspices" of the school.
76
No reasonable observer could conclude that the school had somehow
endorsed Frederick's message, and indeed the school presented no
evidence suggesting as much. For these reasons, Judge Kleinfeld, writing
for the Ninth Circuit panel, concluded that Hazelwoods analysis did not
apply in this case because Frederick's speech "was not sponsored or
endorsed by the school."77
In their argument to the Court, the school officials contended that
Hazelwood meant that the school could silence Frederick in order to avoid
having his message attributed to them. 8 They argued that Principal
Morse had a "responsibility to 'disassociate' the school from the
banner[]" because if she "had been insouciantly indifferent to
Frederick's drug-related banner, many in the community might well have
wondered what they are teaching at taxpayer-supported Juneau-Douglas
High School."7 9 This argument-that by failing to censor it, school
administrators were putting their seal of approval on student speech-
has never before been accepted by the Court; indeed the Court has
repeatedly rejected it. Prior to Morse, a plurality of the Court explained
that "[t]he proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail
to censor is not complicated."8 Indeed, the Court held that "secondary
school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a
school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits
on a nondiscriminatory basis."8? Lower courts have taken the same view.
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has explained, "The school's proper
" Id. at 268.
7' Id. at 272-73.
76 Id. at 272.
77 Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2006).
7' Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 15.
7 Id. at 33-34.
0 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)
(plurality).
8' Id; accord Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 64-65 (2006) (holding that by accommodating military recruiters on
campus, law schools would not be "viewed as sending the message that they see
nothing wrong with the military's policies, when they do"); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995) (holding that concern that student
message would be attributed to the school was "not a plausible fear"); see also Hedges
v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1993) (In an
effort to avoid the appearance of school-sponsorship of a student's speech, the school
district may not "throw up its hands, declaring that because misconceptions are
possible it may silence its pupils, that the best defense against misunderstanding is
censorship.").
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response is to educate the audience rather than squelch the speaker"
when students express view of which school authorities disapprove.
In Morse, the school appeared primarily concerned that members of
the general public-as opposed to their students-would believe the
school was endorsing Frederick's message by failing to censor it.83 This
approach, however, strengthened Frederick's position. Courts already
accept the notion that secondary school students "can appreciate the
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school
permits because legally required to do so. A fortiori, there is no basis
for finding faulty attribution to school authorities when full-grown adults
encounter an offbeat declaration by a young man.85
The question raised by Hazelwood's "school-sponsored speech"
analysis is not whether the school allowed student attendance at a public
event, but rather whether there was school sponsorship of the student's
speech. Lower courts, moreover, have concluded that "school
'sponsorship' of student speech is not lightly to be presumed."86 This
approach makes sense because under the logic of Hazelwood, censorship
authority is granted only when a student speaker occupies a platform that
has been provided and sponsored by the school. The Morse case falls
outside that principle for a simple reason: No reasonable person could
have concluded that school authorities had published, endorsed or
promoted the message that appeared on Frederick's banner.
VI. I HEREBY SANCTION THEE: SCHOOLS' MYSTERIOUS NEW POWER
The Olympic Torch Relay and Frederick's banner clearly do not
meet the Court's definition of school sponsored speech. Unable to
properly invoke the term "sponsored," the school district and their amici
appear to cast about for the best way to describe the students' attendance
at the Olympic Torch Relay. Many other terms are bandied about-
authorized, approved, related, supervised-but it is "sanctioned" that
found particular favor with the Supreme Court majority. Chief Justice
Roberts stated that the students' viewing of the relay "was sanctioned by
Principal Morse 'as an approved social event or class trip, ' ' ' ' and he
82 Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1299; see also Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir.
1988) (finding "under-ground newspaper" distributed on school grounds at a school
picnic could not reasonably be viewed as school sponsored).
83 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 33 (referring to what "many in the
community" might be thinking and complaining that Frederick's banner was on
television "for the community (and the world) to see").
84 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65.
85 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (finding
that the public would not attribute to a shopping center owner the expressive views of
others who are allowed to speak on the property).
8" Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3rd Cir. 2001) (finding
that school's anti-harassment policy was facially unconstitutional).
87 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007) (emphasis added).
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refers to it as a "school-sanctioned' event and a "school-sanctioned
activity.
While it receives only brief discussion by the Court, the adoption of
the school sanctioned event phrasing is groundbreaking. The Supreme
Court had never before recognized or alluded to the power of a school to
take title to an otherwise public event to which it has contributed neither
its name nor its resources. That it does so in this case opens up many
questions about the scope of the school's new-founded sanctioning
powers. Difficulties are heightened because the Court introduced this
new concept without defining it, citing any legal support for it, or
explaining its limits.
Following the Court's logic, public schools now potentially have the
power to sanction any event they choose, whether public or private and
whether commercial or non-commercial in nature. By pronouncing an
event to be school sanctioned, the school apparently can enhance its own
authority to suppress or censor speech by its students that occurs at that
event.
The Court offers no guidance as to what, if any, procedures the
schools must follow in order to exercise their sanctioning power. In
Morse, there is no evidence as to what, if anything, the principal did to
sanction the torch relay. It is apparent from the record that she did not
formally inform the students or their parents that this public event had
been sanctioned. And there is nothing to suggest she made any sort of
announcement of the sanctioning or any kind of record as to when and
how this decision was made. The principal apparently was allowed to
make the sanctioning decision unilaterally, because there is no evidence
that she conferred with or informed any other school official about the
sanctioning decision. And, even if others were made aware of the
sanctioning, there does not seem to be any procedural due process right
for the students or their parents to appeal the principal's decision to
sanction a public event. In light of these facts, Morse seems to stand for a
sweeping principle: Any school principal, by herself and without
guidelines, has the power to sanction a public event and thereby lessen
every student's free speech rights at the event with no obligation to give
the students, their parents, or anyone else, prior notice and opportunity
for appeal.
The Court's endorsement of this new power also raises difficult
questions about the sort of events the school can sanction so as to
diminish student free speech rights. It can be surmised from the Morse
case that it does not matter if the event is commercially sponsored, open
to the public, and occurs on public property. It makes no difference if, as
in Morse, the event does not bear the school's name or insignia. Judging
from Morse, the school need not require attendance by the students or
permission from the students' parents. And it is at least questionable
8 Id. at 2623-24 (emphasis added).
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whether the school has an obligation to effectively supervise the students
during the event it has sanctioned.
In Morse, it was noted that the principal had sanctioned the viewing
of the torch relay "as an approved social event or class trip."8 9 This is
suggestive of a student field trip. The Supreme Court has never
addressed the issue of student speech rights while on a field trip or
defined what constitutes a "field trip." A traditional school field trip,
however, typically involves a plan that has been preapproved in writing by
a school administrator to take students, as a well-supervised group, to an
off-campus location for an educational purpose. A number of forms are
generally required including parental permission slips and emergency
contact information. Without such formalities, the students may not
participate. The students then meet on school grounds where they are
transported, as a group, to the outside location.
Was attending the torch relay a school field trip in this vein? The
Supreme Court does not explain it as such. Certainly a number of
elements are missing: There was no formal preapproval or permission
slips, and yet students were allowed to leave school property with minimal
to no supervision. Frederick never gathered initially on school grounds
with his classmates, but traveled to the public event entirely by himself. It
is not even clear that the event needs to take place during traditional
school hours, as was the case in Morse. At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg
asked the school's attorney, Kenneth Starr, if the school's power would
lessen had the Olympic Torch Relay occurred on a Saturday. She asked:
Suppose it were Saturday, not a school day. And the school children
were not required to show up at the Olympic event but were
encouraged to and the same thing happened. Would it make a
difference that it wasn't in the course of a regular school day?90
Starr responded that it would make no difference, because the event on
any day of the week "would be school sponsored."'" Thus, if particular
factors common to a field trip are required for sanctioning an event, the
Court fails to outline them or set any limits.
Even under the field trip analogy, there remain unanswered
questions about the reach of the school's sanctioning power. Suppose the
school had organized a field trip one Saturday to view a political rally in
town square. The school group arrives to find Frederick and his banner
already in place-on public property at a public event. Does the fact that
a school designated for a field trip the same site where Frederick
independently chose to appear give the school power to censor his
expression? Does the fact that the school might have sanctioned the rally
do so? Does the mere fact that a field trip occurred automatically mean
the event has been sanctioned? Again, the Court provides no answers.
Id. at 2624.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 15.
Id.
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From all appearances, school authorities need do nothing more than
declare, after the fact, that they had sanctioned student attendance at an
event. This simple act thus converts a constitutionally protected, public
free speech act into an unprotected school-speech situation that exposes
the speaker to government censorship and punishment. By seeming to
recognize this new, ill-defined power of school officials to sanction
public, off-campus events, the Supreme Court potentially has opened the
door to unexplored areas of school restrictions on student speech. The
problems with these implied new powers are many. And because the
sanctioning authority is currently so vague and unclear, it is difficult to
determine how it might be interpreted in future cases.
Under its broadest interpretation, this wide-sweeping view of school
power over independent, off-campus student speech has the potential to
chill all types of student expression. The school could sanction
attendance at a planned rally on a matter of public debate, such as illegal
immigration or gay rights, as an educational activity. It would certainly be
reasonable for a school to decide that there are learning opportunities in
having students write letters to the editors of local newspapers, produce
off-campus publications or create and maintain weblogs thus leading
them to sanction these activities. Trips to museums, zoos, aquariums and
historical landmarks could certainly qualify as sanctionable educational
outings. And a Fourth of July parade or other expression of community
pride would seem to be as educational, and therefore sanctionable, as the
Olympic Torch Relay. The school might wish to encourage students to
engage in artistic or literary endeavors during their off-hours as a school-
sanctioned activity.92
Nothing in the Supreme Court's Morse decision, moreover, indicates
that the school's sanctioning power must be limited to events and
activities with an educational element. Indeed, the torch relay itself was
not particularly educational in nature; it was instead an occasion of
community celebration and pride. Does the Court mean to suggest that
there is no boundary to what a school can sanction, including with regard
to social, religious, or work-related events? Might a student be open to
punishment for what he says at the grocery store or local shopping
mall?93 Such a result would contradict the Court's holdings in Tinker that
"[u]nder our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is ,iven only to
be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact.
92 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001) (Court upholds
punishment of student for poem he wrote at home and not for a school assignment.
The student brought the poem to campus to show his teacher for feedback).
" See, e.g., Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (On a Sunday
afternoon at a shopping center, a student sees a teacher and calls him a "prick." The
court upheld the ability of the school to discipline him, stating that "[t]o
countenance such student conduct even in a public place without imposing sanctions
could lead to devastating consequences in the school." Id. at 772).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
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In developing First Amendment rules, the Court has looked askance
at vagueness because of fears it will lead speakers to engage in self-
censorship even with regard to protected expression. This "chilling
effect," according to the Court, is "a harm that can be realized even
without an actual prosecution." 9 In the Morse case, Frederick claimed he
had tried to stay outside of the school's jurisdiction when displaying his
banner. In his deposition testimony, he said that he and his friends
"purposely avoided the high school grounds itself' because they "wanted
to be on a public sidewalk but not on school grounds so there would be
no reason for the school to bother us and so it would be clear that we
had free speech rights. ' '16 It turns out that Frederick had misjudged the
reach of his school's control over him. Yet no evidence indicates that he
had been informed by his principal, or by anyone, that his school had
sanctioned this event. The principle articulated in Morse raises similar
risks for countless students. Does the member of a high school Gay-
Straight Alliance, who attends a Gay Pride march with other club
members, run the risk that school authorities might later sanction this
gathering? If the faculty club advisor or the faculty mentor joins the
parade or even watches from the sidewalk? What if the principal chooses
to monitor the event with a view to controlling student misconduct?
An inability of speakers to predict whether their speech will or will
not subject them to punishment is a constitutional concern of the highest
importance. That the speakers happen to be public school students, or
that their messages might seem to many to be cryptic or of questionable
value does not quiet the First Amendment alarm bells. These questions
illustrate both the potential breadth of the Court's new-fangled "school-
sanctioned event"-and the risk of chilling effects it creates.
VII. CONCLUSION
After almost twenty years of silence on school speech, the Supreme
Court's decision to hear a case addressing students' First Amendment
rights while at school was commendable. Unfortunately, the Court
selected a case with a messy factual problem-it was not at all clear that
the student speaker was actually "at school." At best, this factual question
made the case a poor vehicle for the Court to address the underlying
school-speech issue. At worst, however, it caused the Court to quietly, and
with little discussion or guidance, expand the power of school
administrators to restrict the free speech rights of their students.
By failing to properly recognize the jurisdictional issue in this case,
the Supreme Court left open a variety of questions regarding the reach of
public schools over off-campus student speech. In the coming years lower
courts, and perhaps the Supreme Court itself, will need to answer these
questions as they arise in actual cases or controversies. Until then,
Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n., 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988).
96 Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 28.
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student speakers will face much uncertainty as to when, where, and how
they might have unknowingly shed their constitutional rights-even
beyond the schoolhouse gate.
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